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DAVID BOWEN, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
RUTH OLSEN, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
BRIEF CF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE NO. 15,137 
Appellee suggests that the Court will better understand 
the facts if Exhibit 2 is kept in front of the reader for 
ready reference. 
In the fall of 1975, Mrs. Ols~n was the owner of approxi-
~ately five acres of land located at 1400 North and 200 West 
in Provo. (Exhibit 1). The property has about 400 feet of 
frontage on 200 West and the north and south lines are 
approximately parallel in an east west direction. The 
eastern boundary was on an angle generally north-northeast 
as the navigator might call it. Within a distance of 50 to 
100 feet from the east boundary the property is bisected by 
a canal coDrnonly called the Hill Race which runs generally 
north and south approxiraately parallel to the east boundary. 
llrs. Olsen was formerly Hrs. Frazier and Exhibit 1, 
Prepared by the engineer and surveyor erroneously labels the 
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pro[_)erty as Frazier property. His second diagram, Exhihit 
corn:!cts his error and [_)roperly designates it as the 0ls": 
property. 
In the fall of 1975 !'!rs. Olsen began to receive a 
number of proposals relating to the property. In order tn 
explain those proposals and better understand the facts. 
they are considered chronologically. 
1. Summer of 1975. It was contel'.lplated by Mrs. Ols 2. 
that the city would construct a road running east and west 
along the south side of the property. This ~treet was 
necessary because of the large apartment house complex t<i&t 
was then under construction on North lJniveu;i ty iwenue eas: 
of the Olsen property. This street requirement was furthe~' 
dictated by the fact that there were no other east and w2st 
streets between 1230 North and 1550 North. 
2. September 3, 1975. Earnest Money Peceipt and Offc. 
to Purchase - Walters. (Exhibit 3). On this date a Mr. 
Warren C. Walters made a proposal to Mrs. Olsen to purchasi 
the property shown as parcel A on Exhibit 2. The proper~ 
which Mr. Walters then desired to purchase was 163.03 foo'. 
of frontage on 200 West which commenced 33 feet north ot 
Mrs. Olsen's south boundary. The reason for the 33 foot 
reservation is that it was then contemplated that Mrs. Ole 
would contribute the 33 feet for a proposed roadway to Pr: 
City. 'l'ha t of fer 11as never acce~Jted. 
3. Decel'.lber 19, 1975. Earnest noney Receipt and o:' 
to Purchase - Vialters. (Exhibit 4). At this time t!r. i!al 
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3 g3in negotiated a purchase of substantially the same pro-
perty described in his previous earnest money, except that 
this time he was to acquire the 33 feet and to make the 
dedication of the roadway to Provo City himself. This offer 
was accepted. The offer by its terms required closing on or 
b2fore December 31, 1975. 
4. December 22, 1975. Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase - Bowen. (Exhibits 5 and 6). The property sub-
ject to this offer lies immediately to the east of the 
property subject to the Walters offer of December 19, 1975. 
Exhibit 5 is the Earnest Noney Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase as signed by llr. Bowen. At that time, Dece~ber 
22, 1975, the option language on lines 47 to 55 was not 
included. The option was added on January 8, 1976, by Mr. 
Ronald G. Gardner, acting on behalf of Mr. David Bowen, and 
outside of the presence of Mr. Bowen. (See Exhibit 6). 
Mr. Gardner, on behalf of Mr. David Bowen, prepared this 
instrument on December 22, 1975, however, it was not pre-
sented to rlrs. Olsen until January 8, 1976. 
Gardner, who had been Bowen's agent in the previous 
transaction, arranged to meet with Mrs. Olsen in his office 
on the 8th of January, 1976, after tlrs. Olsen's work day. 
llrs. Olsen was employed at Z.C.N.I., and when she completed 
her duties that day she proceeded to Mr. Gardner's office. 
At that time he added the "option'' language included on 
lines 47 throusn 55 of Exhibit 6 which is as follows: 
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Seller also agrees to give buyer an option on 
part or all property west of piece being pur-
chased. Buyer understands there presently 
exists an Earnest Money Offer in favor of Iron 
Horse Corporation. This is preserved as a bac%-
up to that offer. This option good for ninety 
days from time of original offer being released 
and notice given to buyer. Option to be sarne 
price and terms of contract effected between 
Iron Horse Corporation and Ruth Olsen. (D. 
Ex. 6). 
All of the writing and all of the language contained o· 
Exhibit 6 were selected by Mr. Gardner. At that time, whiJ, 
Mrs. Olsen was present, he called Mr. Lee Bamgartner, Mrs, 
Olsen's real estate agent, and explained the nature of the 
suggested option. Virs. Olsen then signed the document of 
December 22, 1975. She did not know who "Jr\Jn Horse'' Cor-
poration was, but she assur.ied that the language was meaninc·' 
ful to Gardner and Bowen. (R. 104, 106). 
As of January 8, 1976, Mrs. Olsen had never met Mr. 
Bowen, and all dealings related to the Bowen offer were 
conducted by Mr. Gardner. ( R. 101). 
5. Early February, 1976. Mr. David E. Castle contac~'. 
Mrs. Olsen and explained his interest in purchasing her 
property that had heretofore been the subject of Walter's 
offer of December 19, 1973. Walters, by this time, appearc 
to have forfeited his interest in the property. Mrs. Olser 
told Hr. Castle that she could not deal with him becauses~ 
had some sort of an option agreement with Bowen. (R. 110). 
llrs. Olsen told Castle that he would have to resolve the 
matter with Bowen before she could deal directly with hii"· 
( R. llO). 
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Ther-eafter, Mrs. Olsen, i1r. Bamgartner and 11r. Castle 
all talked with Mr. Gardner, who appeared to be Mr. Bowen's 
agent. Hr. Gardner advised all three of these people that 
"Bowen does not want the property". Mrs. Olsen remembered 
the conversation clearly because she had to go to Georgia on 
Febr-uary 16, so she knew the conversation with Mr. Gardner 
took place prior to that date. She located the discussion 
as having occurred in the Z.C.M.I. store when she saw Mr. 
Gardner. He advised her that "Bowen does not want the 
property". (R. 108, 109). 
6. February 17, 1976. Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase - Castle. (Exhibit 7). Mr. Castle testified 
that he had been dealing with Walters in January and Feb-
ruary of 1976 and had discovered that Walters did not want 
the property and could not c?mplete the contract by himself. 
Walters was, however, interested in a portion of the property. 
After learning of the Walters interest in the property, 
he then contacted Gardner to find out if Bowen had con-
tinuing interest in an option on the Walters property. He 
believes that he talked to Gardner on February 17, because 
he has a memo dated that date with information that he could 
only have acquired from Gardner. (R. 194). He at that time 
told Gardner that he had been approached by Walters and had 
agreed that they would allow him to negotiate with Mrs. 
Olsen for the property that ~alters had theretofore offered 
to buy. Gardner and Castle discussed some arrangement to 
~ive Bowen some additional parking on the property that 
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Castle would be buying from Mrs. Olsen if he were succes,:f 
in presenting his Earnest !loney Receipt dnd Offer to Purer 
On the basis of 11r. Castle's discussion with i'lr. Gar~ 
and Mr. Walters, he prepared the Earnest 1ioney Agreer.ient 
dated February 17, 1976, which is Exhibi l 7. He would n0 , 
have prepared that had he felt that there was an outstandi: 
option for the same property on behalf of 11r. Bowen. In::: 
Castle's words, "I had to clear with Ron Gardner in order t 
purchase the property." (R. 193). The Earnest MoneyAgrP:· 
ment of Hr. Castle was not accepted hy Mr,_:, O.ls2n and th" 
proposal failed. 
7. rlurch 11, 1976. E:;rncst t\oney R, .·r'i;>t 0nd Offer 
Purchase - Bowen. (Exhibit 8). At this time, Bowen, still 
acting through Gardner, had concluded he needed an additio .. 
piece of property to the north of that which we had agreeJ 
to purchase. This was made necessary in order to acquire: 
building permit. 
~1r. Gardner represented 11r. Bowen in this entire trar. 0· 
action and Mrs. Olsen never, at any time, met rlr. Bowen. 
By this time, Gardner had visited with Mr. Castle at 
Castle's ho~e in Lindon and they had discussed the Bowen 
property and Castle's negotiation with Mrs. Olsen for thE 
property that had formerly been the subject of the Walters 
transaction. Gardner was advised concerning Castle's pl)r: 
and Gardner never, at any time, told Castle that Bowen r. 3:: 
an option on the property or that he had any interest in· 
Olsen (\valtcrs) property, and in fact, Garoner indicate•' 
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that Bowen had no further interest in the option. 
As of March 4, 1976, Gardner was negotiating with 
castle for additional parking for Mr. Bowen in the event 
castle was able to complete his transaction with Mrs. Olsen. 
(k. 173). Castle testified that when he met with Garnder in 
his home on March 4, 1976, he connected his conversation 
with Gardner with the previous instructions that he had 
received with Mrs. Olsen early in February to the effect 
that he had to get Mr. Gardner's clearance. He was asked 
specifically the following questions: 
Q. When you met with Mr. Gardner in your 
home, did you connect that meeting with 
Mr. Gardner with a comment of Mrs. Frazier 
made earlier in February that you had to 
get his clearance? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And did you assume by the fact that you 
had told him that you were buying the pro-
perty and he registered no dissent that it 
was a agreeable? 
A. Yes, I did. ( R. 206) 
* * * 
Q. Mr. Castle, in respect to your nego-
tiations with Mr. Gardner, did you associate 
Mr. Gardner as being the agent for the bike 
shop? [Mr. Bowen] 
A. Yes, I did. ( R. 207-208) 
Mr. Castle never met Mr. Bowen personally, but had all 
of his dealings concerning the Bowen property with Gardner. 
As of !larch 4, 1976, Mrs. Olsen had never had any 
dealings with Mr. Bowen, except through rlr. Gardner. 
'i'he Earnest 1loney Agreement of March 11, 1976, was 
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handled entirely by Mr. Gardner and Mrs. Olsen did not 
l1r. Bowen. 
8. April 7, 1976. Earnest noney Receipt ar.cl Otfc:r 
Purchase - Castle. (Exhibit 9). On April 7, 1976, Mr. 
Castle revised his Earnest iloney Receipt <:ind subr:iitted it: 
Mrs. Olsen. At this til1'e, the Castle offer 1-1as to inclu~e 
all of the property that had forr;1erly been subject to the 
Walters offer, but including an additional 10 feet to the 
north. (See Exhibit 2). Mr. Ciistle, at this tin1e, had 
acquired an agreer.ient from Mr. 1~.;l ters to ou.i ld ;:i slruct" 1 
on the property purchased for hihl (Walters). Mrs. Olsen 
testified she would not have dealt with 11r, <..:astl~' on lr 
property had she thought that Bowen claimed any further 
interest in the property. She was further of the opinior. 
that Mr. Gardner was completely informed of the Castle 
transaction and Castle testif il1d that Gar::h er was comp le:;_ 
informed of his transaction with Mrs. Olsen. 
9. April 9, 1976. Earnest Money Receipt and Offer tc 
Purchase - Walters, (Exhibit 10). On this date \~alters 
negotiated with t\rs. Olsen to buy the property immediate)\ 
North of that which is being purchased by Castle. ( Exhi~1: 
2). 
The testimony is in dispute as to whether the $4,SC'· 
which was paid on 1\arch 29, 1976, by lir. \·!alters wos tile:: 
apply on the property purchased under Cxh i bit 10, or whe:: 
it was to continue the optioP on the llece1:iL r l CJ, l '-J7'', 
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earnest money agreement. Mr. Bamgartner, who handled the 
matter for rlrs. Olsen, categorically stated that the $4,500.00 
was to be applied with the $500.00 theretofore paid on the 
oeceDber 19th contract as the down payment for the purchase 
of the property covered by Exhibit 10. llr. Walters contends 
that it was consideration for extending his right to purchase 
under the December 19, Earnest Money Offer, Exhibit 4. The 
question is moot, however, since there is no dispute between 
Walters and Mrs. Olsen and Walters apparently was content to 
have the entire $5,000.00 appJy to the earnest floney Agree-
ment, Exhibit 10, which, in fact, has now been converted 
into a deed secured by a Deed of Trust. 
10. April 20, 1976. At this time, the Bowen contract 
was closed and Mr. Gardner and Mr. Bamgartner prepared the 
Warranty Deed, Exhibit 11, the closing statement for seller, 
Exhibit 12, the closing statement for buyer, Exhibit 13, and 
a letter agreement dated April 20, 1976, Exhibit 14. The 
letter agreement pertained to Bowen's responsibility for 
paying for improvement to his property connected with the 
construction of the street. That agreement was written by 
Mr. Gardner. 
The transaction with Mr. Bowen was closed at Zions 
First National Bank (R. 112). Those present at the time of 
closing were Lee Bamgartner, rlrs. Olsen, 11rs. Olsen's son, 
and Ron Gardner, the representative for !lr. Bowen. Mr. 
Bowen did not appear. 
-9-
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~;othing was said at this ti1:1e concerning nr. Do1;er,'~ 
option, if in fact he intended to retain one. 
12. !lay 25, 1976. On this date lir. Jcril E3. i.ib/, 
attorney for tlr. Bowen, wrote a deI'.land letter to firs. G; 
which she received subsequent to that date. (Exhibit));. 
On !lay 28, 1976, Mr. \hlson acting on bchalr of ilr. 
Bowen, filed a Lis Pendins against thP property of Mrs. 
Olsen. (Exhibit 21). 
Because of the letter of tlay 25, and the lis p2ndin: 
that was filed, r.ir. Custle r1£used to go for,1:.ncJ 1Hth t'1i·: 
earnest money agreement dated May 9, 1976, 1-illich was then_ 
the process of closing. 
tion commenced. 
Mr. Bowen acknowledges that all of the transactions 
concerning the acquisition and purchuse of the property i:. 
question were handled on his behalf by Mr. r;ardncr, and a: 
no time prior to the taking of the det:iosi tions in this ca', 
did Mrs. Olsen ever !'1eet !lr. Bowen. Mr. BaI'.lgartner testi-
fied that all of his transactions on behalf of Mrs. Olsen, 
in connection with the Bowen transaction were complet~ 
through Hr. Gardner. 
There is also submitted as Exhibit 20, un Earn2st :::: 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase, between Lawrence \\alters": 
others, with i•ir. David E. Castle. This exhibit was offer, 
to de~onstrate that Castle, as of February 13, 197G, had 
resolved his right to ?Urch0se the W~lters contract 2n 1 
merely waiting authority fro1;i Garclner· on behalf of Gow('il 
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deal directly with Mrs. Olsen concerning the property which 
was subject to the Walters Earnest Money Receipt of December 
19, 1975. 
It is defendant's contention that the ter~s of the 
earnest money agreement of December 22, 1975, (Exhibit 6), 
were merged into the deed and subsequent agreement between 
Mrs. Olsen and Bowen. Since the option was not preserved 
beyond that time, it is null and void. In the alternative, 
defendant asserts that Bowen waived any rights in the option 
by telling 11rs. Olsen, through Gardner, that he was no 
longer interested in the property and allowing her to nego-· 
tiate with Mr. Castle and Mr. Walters. In addition, it is 
defendant's position that the option agreement was not 
supported by consideration, and therefore, it is not an 
enforceable contract. Final~y, the purported option agree-
ment is completely unintelligeable, and therefore, void for 
vagueness. 
POINT I 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT CLEARLY 
ABROGATES ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE EARNEST 
tlOllEY AGREEt·iENT NOT INCLUDED IN THE FINAL CONTRACT OR DEED. 
The language of the Earnest Money Agreement is clear 
that execution of the final contract abrogates the Earnest 
tloney Receipt and Offer to Purchase. 
Lines 39 through 41 of tne Earnest Money Agreement 
contain the following language: 
-11-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is understood and agr.::ed thilt the terns 
written in this receipt constitute the 
entire prel1~inary contrilct between the 
purchaser and the seller, and that no ver-
bal statement made by anyone relative to 
this trans.:iction shall he construed to be 
a part of this transaction unless incor-
porated in writing herein. It is further 
agreed that execution of the final contract 
shall abroq3.te this I~arnest !IOl'C\' ncc·:::i;:it 
and Offer to Purchase:---(E,:1phasi~ add0d): 
It is a well stated rule that "a deed c'xecuted sub-
sequent to the making of an exccutory contYact for the sa\. 
of land supercedes that contract not only -,s to provisions 
made pursuant to the terns of the contrdci liut a lc,o as tr~ 
stipulations in the contract oi which the conveyance is r.0: 
a performance, if the l?.Jrties intc·ndeci Lo .urT011der ther., 
but they are not superceded if the parties did not intend 
surrender them." 77 Am.Jur.2d 449, Vendor and Purchaser, 
Section 290. 
The facts clearly indicate that Bowen never inte~ed · 
preserve the option. Between December 22, 1975, the date 
of writing of the option, and May 25, 1976, there was nev:: 
any indication by Bowen that lw intended to f)reserve the 
option. To the contrary, Gardner, Bowen's agent, repeate~: 
stated to t·'.rs. Olsen, to /lrs. Bamgartner, and to Mr. Castle 
that Bowen had no intention of exercising Lhe option. 1'• 
addition, at the closing of the Bowen-Olsen transaction or 
April 20, 1976, absolutely no mention was ;;iade of prese~·,-. 
the option in the deed ancl a9reeraent execui..ed at that ti: 
The transaction Vl3S closed with tlrs. Olser,, nrs. Olsen'' 
son, Mr. Gardner, and 1lr. Ela1n3artner:- pr:-escnt. liothing" 
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said at that til'le concerning flr. Bowen's option. Prior to, 
and at the time of closing, there was absolutely no evidence 
of Bowen's intent to exercise the option. The only evidence 
of Bowen's intent is to preserve the option is the belated 
letter from Bowen's attorney on May 25, 1976. 
It was upon these factors that the Court based its 
Finding that: 
"The earnest money agreement drafted by 
the plaintiff was a single integrated 
agreement with consideration sufficient to 
support all of the terms of the earnest 
money agreement, including the option, and 
that by the express terms of the earnest 
money receipt and option to purchase, the 
option contained therein was abrogated at 
the time of the finaJ contract. ( R. 14, 
paragraphs 8 and 9). 
A case somewhat similar to the present is Kelsey v. Hansen, 
18 lJtah2d 226, 419 P.2d 198 (1966). That was an action by a 
plaintiff-vendor to compel a real estate agent-purchaser to 
pay for certain extras (drapes and the like) pursuant to an 
agreement in an executed earnest money agreement. There was 
a subsequent conveyance by warranty deed, and the plaintiff's 
theory was that the deed was not decisive of the agent's 
cojnmi ttr:ient to buy and pay for the extras. The court held 
that the deed was decisive and 
"That a merger resulted, especially since 
the Earnest Money Receipt also said that 
'it is further agreed that execution of 
the final contract shall abrogate this 
Earnest ~oney Receipt.' We have diffi-
culty in seeing why a warranty deed to 
Hansen should not abrogate the prelimi-
nary, loosely drawn, and almost incoherent 
Earnest i!oney Receipt, and thus r.ierge what 
really anounted to signed notes of a con-
templated future transaction. 
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In absence of proof to the contrary, there i:3 il C'r· _ 
sumption that the parties intended ull of the Lerrns of l 
prior agree1.1ents to be merged into the deed. \·/ebb v. Gt 
----~ 
212 Kan. 364, 510 P.2d 1125 (1973). And the execution ~f 
deed to realty without any reservation in it, merges all 
prior negotiations and agreements relating thereto. S:iit:, 
Baker, 95 C.A.2d 877, 214 P.2d 94. 
In the present case, there is absolutely no r:iention J' 
all in the warranty deed between Mrs. Olsen and Bowen of t: 
option or a reservation in any 1nannC'r. (Exi1il>it J ). 
Appellant has failed to overcone the presumption th:i~ 
there 1-1as a r11C'rger and has failed to c,J1ow that there v:Js 
not, in fact, an intention of the parties to abrogate the 
option agreement. As a result, the judgr.ient of the trial 
court in that regard should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
BOlrnN, THROUGH HIS AGEt!T GARDI!ER, WAIVEO HIS RIGHT 1; 
CLAIM THE OPTION AND IS ESTOPPED FRON DOING SO. 
It is undisputed that every transaction involving 
Bowen, whether it was with Olsen, Castle, or Walters, was 
negotiated for Bowen by Gardner. Bowen had no personal 
contact, so far as the evidence discloses, with any of tl·: 
parties privy to the property which is in dispute. TherE 
were many negotiations on many occasions between Gardnn 
and Bamgartner, between Gardner and ~rs. Olsen, beLwe2n 
Gardner and Castle, all of which required representatil'"·' 
discussions, assertions, and conclusions. At no tine •' 1 
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Gardner, by words or conduct, state or imply that there was 
a limit to his authority to act on behalf of Bowen. 
On the contrary, Gardner prepared every Earnest Money 
Agree;nent submitted, (Exhibits 5, 6, 8, and 14). He further 
participated in the preparation of Exhibits 11, 12 and 13, 
all on behalf of Bowen and all outside of the presence of 
Bowen. 
None of the parties to this transaction ever met with 
Bowen, but conducted their entire negotiations with Gardner. 
At no time prior to trial did nowen attach ~ny restric-
tions or limitations to the aulhority given to Gardner to 
2ct on his behalf. Finally, iind probably r.iost importantly, 
it was Gardner who added, in his own handwriting, the option 
language to Exhibit 6, after Bowen had signed the document. 
Since Bowen's case is an attempt to enforce the option, 
obviously he cannot quarrel with Gardner's authority to act 
on his behalf with regard to the option. 
An agent is deemed to have the authority inherent in 
the nature of the transaction which he is performing on 
behalf of his principal and for which his principal knows he 
is performing. 3 Am.Jur.2d 472, Agency §71; Park v. Moorman 
1-:fg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 241 P.2d 914, 40 A.L.R. 2d 273 
(1952). 
A principal who authorizes the agent to perform general 
duties, also authorizes the agent to perform all functions 
necessarily i~rlied by reason of the specific duties assigned. 
3 Am.Jur.2d 472, Agency §71. 
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The terr.is of Exhibit 6 were selected by 801ven, uctir,· 
through his agent Gardner. l'lhcn on !l.pril 20, 1976, llowor, 
again acti!lg through his ilgent Garoner, did not 1nak" Jw: 
effort to preserve what hils been deem2d an ortion, tile 
option provision was abrogated, for it was not includeu 1, 
the final contract between the parties. 7hc L.Jll<JlluJC of: 
Earnest Money Agreement so.ys specifically: "It is further 
agreed that execution of the final contract shill! abrogat' 
this Earnest Money Agreement and Offer to Purchase". 
Nowhere in Exhibits 11, 12, 13, and l ,l, i~ thc1 c' a11y 01'-
servation of the option. If Gardner had i he au th or i ty ts 
write the option in the first place, he c< rLcinJy hdcl the 
authority to preserve that option. His failure to speak a~ 
preserve the option is certainly chargeable to Dowen. 
This conclusion is consistent, and only consistent, 
with the testimony of Olsen, Bamgartner and Castle that 
Gardner had advised them that Bowen clained no interest 
whatever in the Walters contract or the property that was 
then contemplated to be purchased by \'lalters. Gardner's 
continued involvenent in the negotiations between Walters 
and Castle and Olsen and Castle required him to give notic 
to those parties that Bowen claimed an option i.1terest. :· 
is inconceivable that Castle and Bamgartner, both experk 
real estate brokers, would deal with the property i tselL 
had they thought Bowen continued to have an intcccst or 
they not relied upon Mr. Gardner's assertion that Bowen 
claimed no interest. Mrs. Olsen's dealings with CJstl 1• 
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only consistent with her assertion that Gardner had told her 
prior to February 16, 
the Walters property. 
that Bowen had no further interest in 
She had specifically told Castle, 
which is verified by Castle, that he would have to get a 
release from Gardner. 
The fact that Castle prepared an Earnest Money Agree-
ment on February 17, 1976, (Exhibit 7), to purchase from 
!!rs. Olsen the Walter's property, is only consistent with 
his conversation with Gardner of that date that the property 
was available for purchase. 
The Earnest Money Agreement of April 9, (Exhibit 10), 
between Castle and Mrs. Olsen, is only consistent with 
Castle's conference with Gardner at Castle's home, which 
occurred on or about March 4, 1976. Mr. Castle told Gardner 
that he, himself, would be the owner of the property, that 
he had no relationship with Mr~ Walters, except that he was 
going to construct an improvenent upon the property and 
lease it to Mr. Walters, but that he was not an agent of Mr. 
Walters. This conversation was sufficient to put Gardner on 
guard and to require him to notify Castle or Mrs. Olsen that 
Bowen had an interest in the property. 
The only logical explanation of Gardner's conduct is 
that he in fact, on February 17, told Castle, and had prior 
to February 16, 1976, told rlrs. Olsen, that Bowen did not 
claim any further interest in the Walters property. 
This circumstance is further corrobrated by the fact 
that !Ir. Gardner had not completed his representation of Mr. 
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Bo\"/en, for he was still negotiating with the proµert·y as 
late as flarch 11, 1976, when he negotiated [or the 
additional 22 feet to the north of the Bowen property anc 
April the 20th when he handled the closing of the trans-
action. 
The only involvement of !·Ir. Bowen in this entire trar:: 
action, was his appearance at Zions First N~tional Bank on 
April 20, for the purpose of signing the borrowers closi~ 
statement, Exhibit 14, and the letter agreeir,cnt dated Apri: 
20, 1976. 
One other powerful fact in corroboratior, of the testi-
mony that Gardnc>r told llrs. Olsen :me' Cas tlc '=hat Bo1;er. 
claimed no option is that Mrs. Olsen by her subsequent 
dealings would have left herself an unsold piece of proper~ 
34.27 feet wide by 245.87 feet deep. (See cross-hatched 
parcel on Exhibit 2). 
would have so acted. 
It is inconceivable t-hat 1lrs. Olser, 
There could be no case in which the broad, general ar .. 
implied authorities of the agent are more consistent witr. 
his conduct than the instant case. The trial court's fine:· 
that "Ronald Gardner, acting for and as the agent of the 
plaintiff, by his words, acts and conduct, cat'sed the defe'· 
dant to believe that the plaintiff had waived, abandoneai-
relinquished his right to exercise the option", should~ 
affirmed. (R. 13, paragraph 7). 
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POINT III 
IN THE EVENT THAT THE OPTION AGREEMENT CONTAINED IN THE 
EARNEST llONEY RECEIPT OF DECE11BER 22, 1975, \~AS NOT ABRO-
GATED, IT \WOLD FAIL FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION. 
The appellant is faced with a dilemna. The Earnest 
~oney furnished by Bowen was tendered prior to the inclusion 
of the option provision. Mr. Bowen, at the time of tendering 
$1,000.00 Earnest Honey, on December 22, 1975, did not include 
the option provision. That was added later on the evening 
of January 8, 1976. If the contract is s0verable as the 
oppellant argues, then certainly, there is no consideration 
for the option. If it is not Geverable, then it fails 
because it was abrogated by not being included in the final 
deed of the sale. 
The Court, in its Findings of Fact No. 8, stated as 
follows: 
"The earnest money agreement drafted by the 
plaintiff was a single integrated agreement 
with consideration sufficient to support all 
of the terms of the earnest money agreement, 
including the option". (R. 14). 
Appellant argues that although there was consideration 
for the entire agreement, the option was a separate agree-
ment that could stand alone. If that is the case, then the 
appellant condones the finding of consideration by the Court 
but condemns the single integrated agreement finding. The 
appellant cannot have it both ways. 
If he disputes the "single integrated agreement" 
finning, then he must necessarily convince the Court that 
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there was consideration for th2 separute option agreener.t. 
This, of course, is impossible because the consideration fo: 
the ear:-iest money agreement was proffered before the optio:. 
agreement was added. The earnest 1'.loney, therefore, coulci 
only be for the offer and could not be for the option. Thi, 
ar0ument is further bolstered by the fact that on l\pril 20, 
when the closing took place, Bowen ')Ot full consideration 
for the earnest money against the purchase price of the 
property described as parcel "B" on Cxhibi t 1 and nothing 
remained as consideration for llle "01Jt 1on". Ji the option 
were to remain as a viable contract, there nad to be con-
sideration for it. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully argues that the trial court ~ 
correct in its analysis of the facts and the applicationot 
the law, and the judgment should be aff irrnea. 
DA?EO this~ day of Ausust, 1977. 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent~ 
Jeril B. \\ilson, Attorney for i\ppellanc, 84 Cast 100 South, 
l:'rovo, Utah S4601, this JjJ!:_ clay of 1\usu~.t, 1977. 
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